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Housing Policy, Mortgage Policy, 
and the Federal Housing 
Administration
Dwight M. Jaﬀee and John M. Quigley
5.1    Introduction
Federal policy aﬀecting housing is dominated by indirect and oﬀ- budget 
activities directed toward homeowners—tax expenditure policies and fed-
eral credit, insurance, and guarantee programs—rather than the direct pro-
vision of housing or the payment of housing allowances to deserving renter 
households. The implicit goal of increasing homeownership was articulated 
by the secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Development 
(HUD) in 2005, and the federal objective of “an ownership society” has been 
made quite explicit.1 Since 2005, however, there has been a sea change in the 
mortgage and credit markets; millions of homeowners, particularly lower-
  income and ﬁ  rst-  time homeowners, have been aﬀected. During the fourth 
quarter of 2008, almost one in ten mortgages in the United States was “in 
trouble.” Delinquencies (i.e., home loans with payments at least thirty days 
overdue) were 7.9 percent of all outstanding mortgages, and 3.3 percent 
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of all home mortgages were in foreclosure. (See the National Delinquency 
Survey of the Mortgage Bankers Association, March 2009.)
This chapter provides a review of the indirect and oﬀ- budget  activities 
supporting housing and homeownership, with special emphasis on the mort-
gage insurance and guarantee programs undertaken by the Federal Hous-
ing Administration (FHA). We begin with a brief review of housing sub-
sidy programs, concentrating on the activities of oﬀ-  budget agencies such 
as the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), the Federal 
Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), as well as the Veterans 
Administration (VA) and the FHA. We review the history and operations of 
these organizations, and we highlight current issues about these institutions 
and their role in the broader economy. We then concentrate on changes in 
the role and inﬂ  uence of the FHA, and we consider an expanded role for 
FHA in a reorganized housing system. We suggest explicit FHA policies 
designed to protect potential home buyers better from unscrupulous “preda-
tory” lenders, and we suggest that incentives would be improved if many of 
the activities undertaken by the government sponsored enterprises (GSEs) 
were assumed by the FHA. This changed emphasis would give a new leader-
ship role to the federal agency that pioneered the long-  term self-  amortizing 
mortgage more than a half-  century ago.
5.2      Federal Housing Programs: Direct Expenditures
As previously noted, federal housing policy is dominated by oﬀ- budget 
programs supporting homeownership and providing subsidies for middle-   
and upper-  income homeowners and home purchasers. In contrast, direct 
federal expenditures for housing programs, those that require Congressional 
appropriations for housing in the annual budget, are concentrated on pro-
grams for lower-  income households and mostly for rental households.
Direct federal expenditures on housing began with the Public Housing 
Act of 1937, a federally ﬁ  nanced construction program that sought the 
“elimination of substandard and other inadequate housing.” Dwellings 
built under the program are ﬁ  nanced by the Federal Government but are 
owned and operated by local housing authorities. Importantly, the rental 
terms for public housing speciﬁ  ed by the Federal Government ensure occu-
pancy by low-  income households, currently at rents no greater than 30 per-
cent of their incomes.
This program of government construction of dwellings reserved for occu-
pancy by low- income households was supplemented in the 1960s by a variety 
of programs inviting the participation of limited-  dividend and nonproﬁ  t 
corporations. Section 8 of the Housing and Community Development Act 
of 1974 further increased the participation of private for-  proﬁ  t entities in 
the provision of housing for the poor. The act provided for federal funds 
for the “new construction or substantial rehabilitation” of dwellings for 
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into long- term contracts with for- proﬁ  t housing developers, guaranteeing a 
stream of payments of “fair market rents” (FMRs) for the dwellings. Low-
  income households paid 25 (now 30) percent of their incomes on rent, and 
the diﬀerence between tenant payments and the contractual rate was made 
up by direct federal payments to the owners of the properties.
Crucial modiﬁ  cations to housing assistance policy were introduced in 
the Section 8 housing program. The restriction that subsidies be paid only 
to owners of new or rehabilitated dwellings was weakened and ultimately 
removed, and payments were permitted to landlords on behalf of a speciﬁ  c 
tenant (rather than by a long- term contract with the landlord). This tenant-
 based assistance program grew into the more ﬂ  exible voucher program intro-
duced in 1987. Households in possession of vouchers receive the diﬀerence 
between the “fair market rent” in a locality (that is, the HUD-  estimated 
median rent) and 30 percent of their incomes. Households in possession 
of a voucher may choose to pay more than the fair market rent for any 
particular dwelling—up to 40 percent of their incomes—making up the 
diﬀerence themselves. They may also pocket the diﬀerence if they can rent 
a HUD-  approved dwelling for less than the FMR.
In 1998, legislation made vouchers and certiﬁ  cates “portable,” thereby 
increasing household choice and facilitating movement among regions in 
response to employment opportunities. Local authorities were also permit-
ted to vary their payment standards from 90 to 110 percent of the FMR. 
The 1998 legislation renamed the program the Housing Choice Voucher 
Program; it currently serves about 1.9 million low-  income households.
In addition to these programs providing rental assistance, direct appro-
priations through the HUD also support a few small programs encour-
aging homeownership: for example, down payment assistance and sweat- 
equity grants.
Direct appropriations under all these programs amounted to $40.1 billion 
in 2009; since 1990, these low-  income housing programs have grown hardly 
at all—by only about 0.5 percent per year in real terms.
5.3    Tax  Expenditures
5.3.1      The Federal Tax Code
The most widely distributed and notoriously expensive subsidy to hous-
ing is administered by the US Internal Revenue Service (IRS). Under the 
tax code, investments in owner-  occupied housing have always been treated 
diﬀerently from other investments. If taxpayers invest in other assets (such 
as equity shares), dividends accruing under the investment are taxed as ordi-
nary income, and proﬁ  ts realized on the sale of the asset are taxed as capital 
gains. At the same time, the costs of acquiring or maintaining the investment 
are deductible as ordinary business expenses in computing a taxpayer’s net 
tax liability under the Internal Revenue Code.100        Dwight M. Jaffee and John M. Quigley
In contrast, if a taxpayer makes an equivalent investment in owner-
  occupied housing, the annual dividend (i.e., the value of housing services 
consumed in any year) is exempt from taxation. In addition, the ﬁ  rst $0.5 
million (for married taxpayers) of capital gains realized on the sale is exempt 
from taxation. Two important components of investment costs, mortgage 
interest payments (up to $1.0 million for married taxpayers) and local prop-
erty taxes, are considered to be deductible personal expenses. In contrast, 
depreciation, maintenance, and repair expenses are not deductible.
These beneﬁ  ts have been in eﬀect since the enactment of the Internal Rev-
enue Code. The budgetary costs of the program (i.e., the foregone income tax 
revenues resulting from these special provisions) are sensitive to monetary 
policy and tax policy. When interest rates increase, the value of the deduction 
for interest payments increases. If federal or local tax rates are reduced, the 
value of the homeowner deduction declines.
The federal tax code also provides two other forms of housing subsidy, 
both directed to renters rather than homeowners: housing tax credits and 
tax- exempt  bonds.
The Low-  Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) Program provides direct 
subsidies for the construction or acquisition of new or substantially rehabili-
tated rental housing for occupancy by low- income households. The LIHTC 
Program permits states to issue federal tax credits that can be used by devel-
opers or property owners to oﬀset taxes on other income or that can be sold 
to outside investors to raise initial development funds for a project. Rents 
for these dwellings are limited to 30 percent of tenant income, and qualiﬁ  -
cation requires that these units be set aside for occupancy by low-  income 
households for a period of thirty years.
Federal tax credit authority is transmitted to each state, on a per capita 
basis, for its subsequent distribution to the developers of qualiﬁ  ed projects. 
The credits are provided annually for ten years, so a “dollar” of tax credit 
authority issued today has a present value of six to eight dollars.
In addition, states have always been permitted to issue debt, and the inter-
est payments made by states (and their local governments) on this debt 
have been exempt from federal taxation. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 for 
the ﬁ  rst time placed a limit on the volume of bonds that could be issued 
by states for private purposes. “Private purposes” include the ﬁ  nancing of 
most tax-  exempt facilities (e.g., airports), industrial development agencies, 
student loans, and housing (multifamily construction and homeowner subsi-
dies). The allocation of private- purpose bond authority among these activi-
ties is supervised by each state, and the priorities among states may vary 
substantially.
The subsidy provided by tax-  exempt bonds—the net diﬀerence between 
the market interest rate and the rate for tax-  exempt paper—varies with 
changes in federal tax rates and with macroeconomic policy. When interest 
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is small, state and local governments may choose not to issue tax-  exempt 
bonds, since the costs of issue (underwriting, bond counsel, etc.) are rela-
tively high.
As indicated previously, the magnitude of tax expenditures for owner-
  occupied housing is dominated by the large and open-  ended subsidies pro-
vided to those homeowners who itemize their deductions or who sell their 
residences in any year. Jaﬀee and Quigley (2007) provide a discussion of the 
method applied by the Oﬃce of Management and Budget for computing 
tax expenditures. To understand the method, it is useful ﬁ  rst to consider the 
income taxation of commercial real estate as a baseline, since it receives no 
important or special tax expenditures. The accrued tax liability for an invest-
ment in commercial real estate is the sum of the taxes accrued on the net 
rental income (NR) generated in any year and the tax on the annual capital 
gain (CG). At a common tax rate on income and gains, t,
(1)  t(NR  CG)  t(GR  MI  PT  DRM  CG),
where the components of net rental income include the gross rents (GR) 
minus expenses for mortgage interest paid (MI), property taxes paid (PT), 
and expenditures for depreciation, repairs, and maintenance (DRM).
In contrast, for owner-  occupied residential housing, gross rental income 
(GR) is not taxable, and capital gains (CG) are essentially untaxed. But 
depreciation, repairs, and maintenance (DRM) are not deductible. This 
special treatment creates a “tax expenditure” for owner-  occupied resi-
dential housing of t(NR  MI  PT  CG). From equation (1), it is 
apparent that
(2)  t(GR  DRM  CG)  t(NR  MI  PT CG).
This means that the tax expenditure for residential housing can equally 
well be computed as the tax beneﬁ  t arising from permitting net rental 
income and capital gains to avoid taxation while allowing the deductibility 
of mortgage interest and property tax payments. (See Quigley [1998] for a 
discussion.)
For 2007, it is estimated that the exclusion of capital gains on housing 
from federal taxation cost the Federal Treasury $34.7 billion in foregone 
revenue. (US Oﬃce of Management and Budget 2008.) This is almost as 
much as all direct Congressional appropriations for low-  income housing 
programs. The deduction for homeowners’ mortgage payments represents 
an additional $100.8 billion in tax expenditures. The property tax exclusion 
cost an additional $16.6 billion, and the exclusion of imputed net rental 
income represented another $7.6 billion in foregone tax revenues. In con-
trast, the Low-  Income Housing Tax Credit represented only $5.8 billion 
in foregone revenues. The issuance of tax-  exempt bonds cost about $1.9 
billion in federal revenue. Overall, federal tax expenditures for homeown-
ers in 2007 were $182.7 billion, or about ﬁ  ve times the tax expenditures for 102        Dwight M. Jaffee and John M. Quigley
all other housing programs. (See Jaﬀee and Quigley [2007] for a detailed 
discussion.)
5.3.2    Mortgage  Credit
Federal support for housing credit began in the aftermath of the great 
depression, with the establishment of the Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) 
System in 1932. FHLBs were chartered by Congress to provide short-  term 
loans to retail mortgage institutions to help stabilize mortgage lending in 
local credit markets. Interest rates on these advances were determined by the 
low rates at which this government agency, the FHLB board, could borrow 
in the credit market. In 1938, the Federal National Mortgage Association 
(FNMA) was established as a government corporation to facilitate a second-
ary market for mortgages issued under the newly established FHA mortgage 
program (described next). The willingness of the FNMA to buy these mort-
gages encouraged private lenders to make FHA, and later VA, loans.
In 1968, the association was reconstituted as a government sponsored 
enterprise, Fannie Mae. The change allowed Fannie Mae’s ﬁ  nancial activity 
to be excluded from the federal budget. Its existing portfolio of government-
  insured mortgages was transferred to a wholly owned government corpo-
ration, the newly established Ginnie Mae. In contrast, ownership shares 
in Fannie Mae were sold and publicly traded. Fannie Mae continued the 
practice of issuing debt to buy and hold mortgages but focused its operations 
on the purchase of conventional mortgages neither guaranteed nor insured 
by the Federal Government. Freddie Mac was chartered as a GSE two years 
later in 1970, but its shares were not publicly traded until 1989. Originally, 
Freddie Mac chose not to hold purchased mortgages in its portfolio. Instead, 
mortgages were pooled, and interests in those pools—mortgage-  backed 
securities (MBS)—were sold to investors with the default risk guaranteed 
by Freddie Mac.
These mortgages, subject to speciﬁ  c balance limits and underwriting 
guidelines—referred to as “conforming conventional” mortgages—are 
securitized by Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae. Until the fall of 2008, these 
MBS were guaranteed against default risk by the GSEs themselves. (They 
are now guaranteed by the Federal Government.) The two mortgage GSEs, 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, operate under Congressionally conferred 
charters, which provide both beneﬁ  ts and obligations. Their federal charters 
oblige the GSEs to support the secondary market for residential mortgages, 
to assist mortgage funding for low-   and moderate-  income families, and to 
consider the geographic distribution of mortgage funding, including mort-
gage ﬁ  nance for underserved parts of urban areas. Their foremost beneﬁ  t is 
an implicit US government guarantee of their debt and MBS obligations. 
This guarantee was reinforced when the two GSEs were placed in a conser-
vatorship in September 2008, an event we return to later.
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they create and guarantee mortgage- backed securities, and (b) they purchase 
and hold whole mortgages and MBS in their on-  balance-  sheet retained-
 mortgage portfolios. The GSEs claim that both business lines are required to 
meet their charter responsibilities to support the secondary mortgage market 
and to unify the geographic distribution of mortgage funding. Economists 
have been quick to point out, however, that the unhedged interest rate risk 
embedded in the retained-  mortgage portfolios creates a large contingent 
liability for the US Treasury and a systemic risk for US capital markets. 
Since the GSEs issue MBS, it also seems clear that the retained-  mortgage 
portfolios are not essential for the agencies to carry out their charter 
obligations.
It is certainly clear that large public subsidies are provided to the GSEs. 
The more important public subsidy to the GSEs arises from the govern-
ment’s guarantee of all their debt and all their MBS obligations. Other ﬁ  nan-
cial institutions would surely be willing to pay a signiﬁ  cant fee to receive a 
comparable guarantee from the Federal Government. This special treat-
ment of the GSEs arose in part because the Federal Government considered 
the GSEs to be “too big to fail.” Alternatively, the Federal Government 
viewed the securities issued by these organizations as safe and sound—if 
not, the government would not have exempted the GSEs from the protec-
tive regulations governing other similarly situated private entities. Thus, 
despite an explicit statement in every prospectus disavowing a federal guar-
antee, the GSEs enjoy lower ﬁ  nancing costs than those of similarly situated 
private ﬁ  rms.2
The GSE debt obligations are classiﬁ  ed as “agency securities” and have 
historically been issued at interest yields somewhere between AAA corpo-
rate debt and US Treasury obligations. This is despite the fact that even 
before their losses on subprime mortgages, the ﬁ  rms themselves merited 
a somewhat lower credit rating.3 An estimate of the cost of this implicit 
federal subsidy for the debt issued by the GSEs can be derived from the 
spread between the interest rates paid by the GSEs for the debt they issue 
and the rates paid by comparable private institutions. This comparison, in 
turn, depends on the credit ratings, maturities, and other features of the 
bonds issued, as well as market interest rates and credit conditions. Quigley 
(2006) provides a detailed review of estimates of this spread that have been 
reported in diﬀerent studies using diﬀerent methodologies. On the basis 
of this kind of evidence, the Congressional Budget Oﬃce (CBO 2001) has 
concluded that the overall funding advantage enjoyed by the GSEs is about 
41 basis points.
2. This beneﬁ  t can be measured either in terms of the subsidized cost of GSE borrowing 
or in terms of the expected costs that would be imposed on the government if it had to make 
restitution to GSE bondholders and MBS investors.
3. The Congressional Budget Oﬃce estimates that without GSE status, the housing enter-
prises would have credit ratings between AA and A. See CBO (2001).104        Dwight M. Jaffee and John M. Quigley
The implicit federal guarantee provides an analogous advantage to GSE-
  issued MBS compared with MBS guaranteed by other private entities. The 
market requires a greater capital backing for a private guarantee than for a 
guarantee made by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac, and the provision of this 
additional capital reserve is costly to private ﬁ  rms. The CBO (2004) has also 
estimated that the advantage enjoyed by the GSEs is about 30 basis points. 
These subsidies could, in principle, either be passed through to mortgage 
borrowers in the form of lower mortgage rates or be retained as proﬁ  ts by 
the GSEs. If an equivalent subsidy were provided to a competitive industry, 
it could be presumed that most, if not all, of the subsidy would be passed 
through to ﬁ  nal consumers. There is evidence, however, that Fannie Mae 
and Freddie exercise considerable market power (see Hermalin and Jaﬀee 
[1996]). However, even duopolists have incentives to pass forward part of 
a subsidy, and there is evidence that a part—perhaps about half—of this 
subsidy is passed through by Fannie and Freddie to mortgage borrowers.4 
The residual fraction of this beneﬁ  t is retained by the shareholders of the 
GSEs. This residual arises from the competitive advantage of the GSEs over 
other ﬁ  nancial institutions, which is conferred by their federal charters.
As noted, estimates of the reduction in mortgage interest rates attrib-
utable to this subsidy have some range—around, say, 40 basis points (see 
Quigley [2006] table 3). If the conforming limit for GSE loans were set low 
enough, more of the beneﬁ  ts of this interest rate reduction would accrue to 
moderate-  income households. But the limit has been set generously by the 
Federal Housing Finance Board. In 2009, conforming mortgages could be 
issued for an 80 percent loan on a property selling for $625,500 ($938,250 
in Alaska and Hawaii).
Even before being placed in a conservatorship, it was diﬃcult to provide 
a precise dollar estimate of subsidy provided by federal taxpayers to the 
GSEs. An up-  to-  date summary of existing studies is available in chapter 6 
in this volume by Lucas and McDonald. Based on the accumulating costs 
of the GSE conservatorships, it now seems likely that the ultimate cost will 
be measured in the hundreds of billions of dollars.
5.4      The FHA and VA Insurance and Guarantee Programs
5.4.1      The Great Depression Origins
Before the Depression of the 1930s, home mortgage instruments were 
typically of short terms (three to ten years) with loan-  to-  value (LTV) ratios 
4. Diﬀering estimates of the reduction in mortgage rates created by the subsidy has resulted 
in a quite contentious literature. Perhaps the lowest estimate, 7 basis points, is provided by 
Federal Reserve economists in Passmore, Sherlund, and Burgess (2005). A much higher esti-
mate is provided by Blinder, Flannery, and Kamihachi (2004) in a study funded and published 
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of 60 percent or less. Mortgages were nonamortizing, requiring a balloon 
payment at the expiration of the term. The onset of the Great Depression 
engendered a liquidity crisis beginning in 1930, precluding renewal of many 
outstanding contracts. Other borrowers were simply unable to make regular 
payments. The liquidity crisis aﬀecting new mortgage loans, together with 
elevated default rates on existing loans, had catastrophic eﬀects on housing 
suppliers as well as housing consumers.
Despite voluntary forbearance on the part of some lending institutions 
and mandated forbearance enacted by many state legislatures, the system 
of mortgage lending that existed in the early 1930s continued to contract, 
and many lending institutions simply failed. The establishment of the Home 
Owners’ Loan Corporation in 1933 within the Federal Home Loan Bank 
System (established a year earlier) provided stop-  gap reﬁ  nancing for a mil-
lion mortgages. Passage of the National Housing Act of 1934 established 
the structure of home mortgage insurance and facilitated the growth of the 
modern system of mortgage ﬁ  nance in the United States.
The 1934 act established the Federal Housing Administration to oversee a 
program of home mortgage insurance against default. Insurance was funded 
by the proceeds of a ﬁ  xed premium charged on unpaid loan balances. These 
revenues were deposited in Treasury securities and managed as a mutual 
insurance fund. Signiﬁ  cantly, default insurance was oﬀered on “economi-
cally sound” self-  amortizing mortgages with terms as long as twenty years 
and with LTV ratios up to 80 percent.
Diﬀusion of this product across the country required national standard-
ization of underwriting procedures. Appraisals were required, and borrow-
ers’ credit histories and ﬁ  nancial capacities were reported and evaluated 
systematically. The modern standardized mortgage was born.5
The Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund, which was established to manage 
the reserve of annual premiums, was required to be actuarially sound. This 
was generally understood to involve very small redistributions from high-
  income to low-  income FHA mortgagees. (See, for example, Aaron [1972].) 
By its original design, the FHA was clearly intended to serve the vast major-
ity of homeowners. Initial loan amounts were restricted to be no larger than 
$16,000 at a time when the median house price was $5,304.6
Near the end of World War II, it was widely feared that the peacetime 
economy would return the housing market to its Depression-  era perfor-
mance. Indeed, housing starts in 1944 were at about the same level as they 
had been a decade earlier. The VA loan program, passed as a part of the GI 
Bill in 1944, rapidly evolved from a temporary “readjustment” program to a 
long- range housing program available to veterans for a decade or more after 
5. See Green and Wachter (2005) for an extensive discussion of this history.
6. The FHA ceiling was reduced to $6,000 in 1938, but that level was still above the price of 
the median house at the time, $5,804.106        Dwight M. Jaffee and John M. Quigley
returning to civilian life. This transformation contributed to the boom in the 
residential construction industry that began in the late 1940s. Ultimately, a 
liberal program of veterans’ home loans was established in 1950 and sub-
sequently extended. In contrast to the insurance provided by the FHA, the 
VA provided a federal guarantee for up to 60 percent of the face value of a 
mortgage loan made to an eligible veteran, subject to a legislated maximum. 
The VA program facilitated loans by private lenders on favorable terms with 
no down payments at moderate interest rates.
5.4.2      The FHA and VA Programs in the Postwar Housing Market
The two programs, FHA and VA, providing government insurance and 
mortgage guarantees, brought homeownership opportunities to middle-
  class American households in a short space of time. Figure 5.1 shows the 
remarkable growth of mortgage originations attributable to these programs.7 
In 1960, about $5 billion in FHA-  insured mortgages and $2 billion in VA 
guaranteed mortgages were issued. The programs reached a peak volume 
in 2003, when the FHA insured about $165 billion and the VA guaranteed 
about $66 billion in mortgages. After 2003, the volumes of mortgage origina-
tions in both programs declined signiﬁ  cantly, so by 2006, the FHA insured 
under $54 billion and the VA guaranteed under $25 billion in mortgages, 
a decline of two-  thirds from their peak volumes recorded just three years 
earlier. However, in the aftermath of the subprime mortgage crisis, the com-
bined mortgage originations of the two government programs rose to just 
short of $300 billion for the year 2008.
The fraction of total mortgage originations attributable to the FHA and 
VA also declined systematically over time until the collapse of mortgage 
markets in 2006. Figure 5.2 reports that the FHA mortgage origination 
share (based on dollar volume) declined from the peak share of about 25 
percent in 1970 to under 2 percent in 2006. The VA guaranteed mortgage 
share has similarly declined from a peak share of almost 28 percent in 1947 
to under 1 percent in 2006. However, in 2008, the share of the two govern-
ment programs exceeded 20 percent of total mortgage originations, levels 
not seen for three decades.
The secular decline in the market share of the two programs and the pre-
cipitous volatility in both market shares and dollar volumes after 2003 raise 
serious policy issues for the future of the two programs. A reasoned policy 
response requires a sound understanding of the forces that contributed to 
7. This ﬁ  gure and the subsequent discussion focus on the single- family insurance programs of 
the FHA and VA agencies. The original mission for the FHA also included multifamily housing, 
and starting in the 1960s, the FHA multifamily programs became signiﬁ  cant in size and scale. 
Indeed, the multifamily program became quite notorious for allegations of waste, fraud, and 
corruption; see Vandell (1995) and Quigley (2006). However, multifamily loans never exceeded 
15 percent of the total FHA portfolio, and today they are less than 10 percent. In this chapter, 
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the secular declines and the recent volatility. We ﬁ  rst analyze the long-  term 
factors and then the more recent contributors.
5.4.3      The Declining FHA and VA Market Shares: Long-  Term Causes
The long-  run decline in FHA and VA originations has arisen from two 
primary factors, both relating to the development of the private mortgage 
insurance (PMI) industry. A signiﬁ  cant PMI industry was ﬁ  rst developed in 
the United States during the housing boom of the 1920s. These insurance 
ﬁ  rms became insolvent in the early years of the Great Depression, and there 
were allegations of fraud and mismanagement as well. The creation of a 
viable PMI industry began in the late 1950s, aided by the evident success of 
Fig. 5.1    Dollar volume of FHA and VA mortgage originations, 1935 to 2008
Source: Historical Statistics of the United States, Oﬃce of Federal Housing Enterprise Over-
sight (OFHEO), and Inside Mortgage Finance
Fig. 5.2    FHA and VA mortgage originations, share of total originations, 1939 
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the FHA and VA programs.8 Until the experience of FHA/  VA mortgages 
was accumulated, it was not well known or widely appreciated just how safe 
conventional home mortgages were from credit losses. Balances in the FHA 
Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund were easily observable to private actors. 
The development of the PMI industry was also abetted by the expansion of 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, whose charters require that credit enhance-
ment be provided on all mortgages they purchase or guarantee with LTV 
ratios above 80 percent. Private mortgage insurance has been the dominant 
form of this credit enhancement.
Secondly, the rules governing FHA and VA coverage aﬀect the government-
  insured market share as a proportion of the total insured market (that is, 
the market that includes PMI and other credit enhancements). In particu-
lar, ﬁ  xed-  dollar limitations on government-  insured mortgages signiﬁ  cantly 
reduced the ability of the FHA and the VA programs to serve middle-   and 
upper-  middle-  income households. Figure 5.3 reports the volume of FHA 
and VA insured mortgages as a fraction of all insured mortgages. As the 
ﬁ  gure shows, the FHA/  VA mortgage share declined quite steadily through 
2006 but then rose dramatically in 2008 at the onset of the subprime mort-
gage crisis.
5.4.4      The Recent Collapse in FHA and VA Program Activity
Although the FHA program was initially developed to support a large 
part of the mortgage market, for the past quarter-  century, its focus has 
been on lower-  income borrowers. Indeed, the Housing and Community 
Development Act of 1981 explicitly established speciﬁ  c targets for serving 
low-  income borrowers. The availability of low down payment FHA mort-
gages and FHA mortgages for those with a less-  than-  perfect credit rating 
has meant that the FHA’s market share of originations has been larger for 
those traditionally disadvantaged in the homeownership market. As a result, 
the overwhelming fraction of FHA borrowers have obtained mortgages 
with LTV ratios of 95 to 98 percent or more, including a large number of 
borrowers with “nontraditional” credit histories or with imperfect credit 
records. The academic literature has documented these speciﬁ  c attributes 
of the FHA clientele. For example, Ambrose and Pennington-  Cross (2000) 
found that FHA market shares are higher in cities with higher economic risk 
characteristics, while Ambrose, Pennington-  Cross, and Yezer (2002) found 
that as local economic conditions deteriorate, conventional lenders tend to 
withdraw mortgage ﬁ  nance, in eﬀect making the government programs the 
only source of credit.
Data released under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) include 
measures of the income and race of borrowers, as well as the census tracts 
8. In 1957, the Mortgage Guaranty Insurance Corporation (MGIC) became the ﬁ  rst private 
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in which they reside. By comparing government-  insured and uninsured 
mortgage originations, it is possible to gauge how well the FHA succeeds 
in serving a lower-  income clientele.9 Figure 5.4 presents estimates of the 
government- insured share of total mortgage originations separately by race. 
In 1997, market shares for black, Hispanic, and white borrowers were 46, 
48, and 20 percent, respectively. By 2005 and 2006, the combined FHAVA 
market share for each borrower group had fallen precipitously to between 
5 and 10 percent. The data for 2007, the most recent data available, show 
a distinct recovery for the government programs, especially among black 
borrowers. This no doubt reﬂ  ects the recent disruption in conventional sub-
prime mortgage markets. It can be assumed that the detailed 2008 HMDA 
data will show an even more dramatic recovery in the market share of the 
government programs.
Figure 5.5 reports the combined FHAVA market share by the income 
of the census tract in which the borrower resides. In 1997, the government 
programs had a 16 percent share of mortgages made in upper-  income 
neighborhoods and close to a 35 percent share of originations in low-   and 
moderate-  income neighborhoods. By 2005 and 2006, the FHAVA share 
for all neighborhood categories had declined precipitously and converged 
to values of about 5 percent. More recent data indicate some recovery in 
Fig. 5.3    Insured mortgage originations by share of total insured originations
9. Quigley (2006) analyzed the same data for the period just before the sharp decline of the 
last three years. The GAO (2007a), published after the ﬁ  rst version of this chapter had been 
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the government program share, especially for moderate-  and middle- income 
borrowers.
Figure 5.6 reports analogous FHAVA market share information by the 
fraction of minorities living in the census tract of origination. By 2005 and 
2006, all these market shares had fallen rapidly to shares of about 5 percent. 
The data for 2007, in contrast, show a recovery close to a 10 percent market 
share for the government programs across all census tracts.
In summary, ﬁ  gures 5.4 to 5.6 indicate that however borrower character-
istics are categorized, the government- insured share had simply collapsed to 
a few percent by 2005 and 2006 before recovering somewhat as the subprime 
mortgage crisis unfolded in 2007. This reinforces the patterns noted previ-
Fig.  5.4  FHAVA share of origination by borrower race, 1997 to 2007
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ously in ﬁ  gures 5.1 to 5.3, with FHA and VA shares falling precipitously 
through 2006, then rising steadily through 2007 and 2008.10
We now consider the factors responsible for this precipitous decline in 
FHA and VA originations from 2003 through 2006. We identify four spe-
ciﬁ  c factors: subprime lending, predatory lending, GSE competition, and 
the failure of the FHA to innovate its mortgage contracts. We discuss each 
in turn.
Subprime Lending
Figure 5.7 shows the dramatic inroads that conventional subprime lend-
ing made as a share of total home mortgage originations.11 As recently 
as 2002, subprime lending represented only 7 percent of total mortgage 
originations, but its market share peaked at more than 21 percent by 2006. 
This 14 percentage point increase in market share coincides with the pre-
cipitous decline in FHA and VA lending. Correlation, of course, need not 
imply causation. But the subprime lenders and the government-  insured 
lending programs share a very similar clientele—focusing on borrowers 
with lower credit scores, oﬀering lower down payments, and so on. So, it 
Fig.  5.6  FHAVA share of originations by census tract percent minority popula-
tion, 1997 to 2007
10. The aggregate data use the HUD’s estimates of total mortgage originations and FHA 
and VA mortgage originations based on information reported by the agencies. The HMDA 
data, in contrast, are based on a sample of large, for-  proﬁ  t, and metropolitan lenders who are 
required to report their loan applications and loans awarded. The higher FHAVA market 
share in the HMDA data arises if the surveyed lenders have a higher share of government-
  insured mortgages than the universe of all lenders.
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seems highly plausible that the expansion of the subprime loan market 
is the source of most of the decline in the market share of the FHA and 
VA programs.
The great ﬁ  nancial distress of some subprime borrowers has been reﬂ  ected 
in rising foreclosure rates on these mortgages. Figure 5.8 compares the fore-
closure rates on FHA, VA, and conventional mortgages in recent years, 
based on data from the Mortgage Bankers’ Association (MBA). Prior to 
1998, the annual default rates for the available categories never reached as 
high as 2 percent. In contrast, the foreclosure rates on subprime loans, with 
data starting in 1998, are almost an order of magnitude higher, exceeding 
9 percent annually in 2001 and approaching 14 percent of year-  end 2008. 
In recent years, the FHA foreclosure rate has remained moderately high, 
above 2 percent, while the VA foreclosure rate has remained above 1 percent. 
The foreclosure rate on prime conventional loans, stable for many years, is 
approaching 2.0 percent by year-  end 2008.
The growth of the subprime loan market was certainly one source of the 
recent decline in the FHA and VA market shares. But this raises the deeper 
question of why the subprime market expanded so suddenly. What skills or 
techniques were subprime lenders able to adopt—quite suddenly, it appears, 
in about 2000—that were not evident earlier? This is a key question for 
the government-  insured programs, since it may identify the missing skill or 
technique that could allow them to regain a reasonable share of the lower-
  income mortgage market on a sustained basis. Given the relatively short 
history of the subprime market and the uncertainty over how (or whether) 
it will survive its current crisis, answers are necessarily speculative. Never-
theless, three factors appear to be crucial:
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1.  Technology. Access to large bodies of information concerning cur-
rent borrowers and past loan outcomes has been combined with comput-
ing power and statistical methods to extract useful information concerning 
likely default rates and loan costs, especially for lower-  quality borrowers.
2.  Contract innovation. The subprime mortgage markets created new 
“alternative” mortgage contracts (including interest- only, optional- payment, 
and incomplete-  document loans).12 They have also expanded the use of 
traditional formats (such as adjustable-  rate and negative-  amortization 
mortgages) as alternatives to the standard, ﬁ   xed- rate,  long- term  mortgages 
oﬀered by FHA and VA.
3.  Securitization. Many of the lenders utilizing this new technology and 
sponsoring innovative contracts have a limited capacity to hold mortgages, 
so it has been essential they have access to the new and eﬃcient techniques 
of mortgage- backed and asset- backed securitization for selling newly origi-
nated loans in the secondary market.
Although these factors that created the subprime mortgage boom and 
crisis are reasonably clear (see, for example, Quigley [2008]), it is very unclear 
how the mortgage market will be restructured in the aftermath of the crisis. 
The FHA and VA markets clearly received renewed demand during 2007 
and 2008 as the subprime market crashed. In the longer run, however, the 
market for alternative mortgages does rest on some sensible fundamentals—
technology, contract design, and securitization—so it is an interesting ques-
12. See Piskorski and Tchistyi (2007) for a discussion of the new alternative mortgages based 
on the concepts of security design.
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tion of whether that market will continue to operate in some form as a viable 
competitor for the FHA and VA government insurance programs. We will 
return to this issue when discussing the future of government insurance 
programs in section 5.5.
Predatory Lending
Headlines in the business press as well as the popular press have drawn 
attention to predatory lending practices as well as subprime mortgages. 
Predatory loans generally refer to loans that the borrower would have 
rejected with full knowledge and understanding of their terms as well as 
those of available alternatives. In practice, predatory loans rely on a range 
of practices including deception, fraud, and manipulation that create loans 
with terms that are highly disadvantageous to the borrower, thus creating 
a high likelihood of default (to which the lender is generally immune; see 
Government Accountability Oﬃce [GAO] 2004 and Morgan [2007]).13 
The two key features of predatory loans are as follows: ﬁ  rst, the borrower 
would not have agreed to the loan had he or she understood the terms and 
conditions; and second, the lender or investor earns an acceptable return, 
even if the borrower defaults. These features contrast with other conven-
tional or alternative loans in which the borrower beneﬁ  ts from the loan 
and in which the lender (or loan investor) suﬀers a loss if the borrower 
defaults.
In July 2008, the Federal Reserve issued important additions to the Truth 
in Lending Act (TILA), and the HUD has prepared parallel changes in the 
rules implementing the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act. The key 
component of the TILA reform is a suitability requirement that requires 
lenders on subprime mortgages (after October 1, 2009) to verify that the 
borrower is capable of making mortgage payments at the highest level the 
mortgage contract can require. There are also restrictions on “teaser rates,” 
low-   or no-  documentation loans, and prepayment penalties.14 In addition, 
subprime mortgages now require certiﬁ  ed house value appraisals. Had 
those requirements been in eﬀect earlier, predatory lending would have been 
reduced, and quite possibly, the subprime mortgage crisis would have been 
less severe.
Another useful regulatory approach would focus on disclosures and 
incentives that can mitigate the informational asymmetry under which inex-
perienced borrowers are unaware of more beneﬁ  cial alternative contracts for 
which they may also qualify. For example, mortgage brokers often receive 
their full commission soon after a loan is closed. If the loan subsequently 
13. Speciﬁ  c devices include loan ﬂ  ipping (repeated reﬁ  nancing with excessive prepayment 
penalties), unexpected balloon payments, and mandatory arbitration.
14. In the original 2007 version of this chapter, we emphasized the importance of a suitability 
requirement to eliminate future predatory lending, as well as prohibitions against teaser rates 
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defaults, there is no recourse to the broker for the commission already paid. 
Mortgage brokers thus have some incentive to recommend loans to borrow-
ers, even when they suspect that the default probability is high. An incentive-
 compatible reform would impose a delay on the payment of origination fees 
and commissions to mortgage brokers, at least until the borrower creates 
a credible record of on-  time payments. More generally, it would seem that 
the best way to mitigate asymmetric information is to create a standardized, 
nonpredatory, alternative loan and to require that all lenders making loans 
to lower-  income borrowers disclose the availability of this loan. As noted 
next, this could be an important function of an expanded FHA.
The Government Sponsored Enterprises Go “Down Market”
The expansion of the GSE mortgage portfolios into riskier mortgages 
is a third important factor that reduced the market share of the FHA and 
VA government insurance programs. The GSE expansion was partly proﬁ  t 
motivated, since the GSEs required new markets if they were to expand 
beyond their traditional domain of prime-  conforming mortgages. But it 
was also regulatory based, since the GSEs faced “aﬀordable housing goals,” 
which required that they allocate speciﬁ  ed shares of their lending activity to 
various classes of lower-  income borrowers. (See Weicher [2006] and Jaﬀee 
and Quigley [2007] for detailed discussions of the goals.)
The academic literature has conﬁ  rmed the “down-  market” expansion of 
the GSEs and has found it to have a measurable impact on the traditional 
domain of the government-  insured programs. An and Bostic (2008) pre-
sented quantitative evidence that the GSEs are increasingly targeting bor-
rowers who would otherwise represent the higher-  quality segment of FHA 
borrowers. Using HMDA data, they conﬁ  rmed the fact that as the GSE 
share of originations in an underserved neighborhood expands, the FHA 
share declines. Their theoretical model also predicts that in response to GSE 
competition, the FHA will raise its underwriting standards in order to con-
trol what is now a lower-  quality loan pool, on average. Most recently, An 
et al. (2007) have investigated the relationship between the GSE aﬀordable 
housing goals and the FHA clientele. Using a sample of FHA loans, they 
conﬁ  rmed the decline in the quality of the FHA borrowing pool. They also 
found that FHA borrowers exercise their reﬁ  nancing options less aggres-
sively, consistent with other studies of lower-  income borrowers and those 
with lower credit ratings.
Analyses of the “overlap” in clientele also help measure the possible sub-
stitution between GSE and FHA loans. The HUD has commissioned several 
studies of this overlap, including a thorough analysis by Abt Associates 
(HUD 2005). The Abt analysts used microdata on borrowers and their loans 
to estimate two statistical models: one predicting the choice of an FHA loan 
and the other predicting borrower choice of a GSE loan. If the 95 percent 
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or 1.0 for either the FHA or the GSE category, then the loan was character-
ized as an “overlap.” Based on data from 1998 to 2000, HUD (2005) found 
that 10 to 14 percent of the loans made by FHA fell in the “overlap” region. 
This result is consistent with the academic studies documenting substitution 
between the FHA and GSE loans. The quantitative estimate does indicate 
that no more than 14 percent of the FHA clients would also qualify for GSE 
loans. However, the HUD analysis was based on data from 1998 to 2000. As 
the GSEs have lowered their underwriting standards since then, the degree 
of overlap has greatly expanded.
Failures in Contract Innovation and in Underwriting at the FHA
The previous sections indicate how subprime, predatory, and GSE 
lenders have greatly reduced the market share of FHA and VA loans in 
recent years. It is natural to ask why the government programs have not 
responded with innovative contracts and underwriting methods of their 
own in order to protect their market share. Indeed, historically, the FHA 
was responsible for crucial innovations in the US mortgage market: the 
ﬁ  xed-  payment, long-  term, fully amortizing mortgage in the 1930s and the 
ﬁ  rst mortgage- backed securitization program—Ginnie Mae—in the 1970s. 
In recent years, however, the FHA has shown a distinct disinclination to 
innovate.
In particular, the FHA has oﬀered no response to the new alternative 
mortgages created as part of the subprime market. At least in principle, the 
FHA could have created better-  designed mortgages that would have miti-
gated or even averted the major losses. One major handicap is the FHA’s out-
dated credit scoring model, which suggests that the FHA cannot adequately 
judge the quality of borrowers or loans, nor can it implement risk-  based 
pricing by charging higher insurance fees on demonstrably riskier mortgages 
(see GAO [2006a]). Given that most of the recent mortgage innovations 
have involved somewhat riskier contracts, it is essential that these risks be 
reﬂ  ected in the insurance premiums (unless a subsidy to riskier borrowers 
is an explicit policy). To be sure, the FHA requires Congressional approval 
before it can carry out these and related innovations. Mobilizing Congress 
to act is a time-  consuming friction at the least, one that surely inhibits the 
innovative process (see Weicher [2006]).
There is also a sense that the failure of the FHA to innovate reﬂ  ects to 
some degree the agency’s philosophy. This is suggested in the report commis-
sioned by the HUD in 1995, at a time when the FHA was facing an earlier 
crisis concerning its future. A major part of that report argues that the FHA 
clientele is “unique,” with no signiﬁ  cant overlap with either private mort-
gage insurance or the GSEs. The report dismisses what were the early signs 
that the conventional mortgage market was making headway in meeting the 
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Only FHA allows for a combination of credit histories, cash balances, 
downpayments and payment ratios, which provide mortgage credit oppor-
tunities to families with past credit problems and broken income streams. 
Because of this, private market initiatives will grow as they attract new 
homeowners, but they will not signiﬁ  cantly diminish the core business of 
FHA. (HUD 1995, 7–  2)
A bit later, the report lists some “distinctive” FHA beneﬁ  ts: up to full ﬁ  nanc-
ing of up-  front loan closing costs and insurance premiums, lower down 
payment requirements on both home purchase and reﬁ  nancing loans, higher 
allowances for seller- paid closing costs, and greater protections against fore-
closure.
These FHA “beneﬁ  ts” are hardly distinctive, and they are certainly not 
unique.
The FHA has also resisted implementation of risk-  based pricing for its 
insurance premiums. From its inception in 1934 through 1983, the FHA 
charged a ﬂ  at annual insurance premium of 0.5 percent on the outstanding 
loan balance—very low by current standards. In 1983, the FHA switched 
to a 3.8 percent, one-  time, up-  front fee that was revenue neutral overall 
compared to the earlier system. As a result of worsening underwriting 
experience during the 1980s, the 1990 National Aﬀordable Housing Act 
(NAHA) required an increase in the FHA premiums and for the ﬁ  rst time 
imposed higher premiums on loans with higher LTV ratios. However, in 
practice, this component of risk-  based pricing was quantitatively minor. 
The major consequence of changes mandated by the NAHA was that for 
the ﬁ  rst time, FHA premiums became signiﬁ  cantly higher than the PMI 
premiums a borrower would pay if he or she qualiﬁ  ed for both insurance 
programs. Since rational borrowers who are eligible for both FHA and PMI 
loans would always choose the lower-  cost PMI option, the FHA argues 
that at least in principle, there is no eﬀective overlap between the FHA and 
PMI clientele.
In summary, it appears that two of the three forces that lead to the dra-
matic growth in subprime lending, technology and contract innovation, are 
missing—seemingly intentionally missing—from the current FHA strategic 
plan. Furthermore, even the third factor, securitization, for which the FHA 
was once the leader with its Ginnie Mae program, is at risk for the ﬁ  rst time. 
The Ginnie Mae program will not able to maintain a liquid market for its 
mortgage-  backed securities unless its supply of raw material—newly origi-
nated FHA and VA mortgages—were to expand.
5.4.5      FHA Single-  Family Program Subsidies
The mortgage insurance fund for FHA’s single-  family housing insurance 
program has remained solvent continuously, and with the exception of a 
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FHA has also reported under the budget accounting rules speciﬁ  ed in the 
Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990 (FCRA) that the program provides a 
net surplus to the government; that is, the program is estimated to provide a 
negative subsidy to general taxpayers—as much as $1.5 billion during ﬁ  scal 
year 2003. This is an important factor, because the FHA is a “discretion-
ary” program and otherwise would require an annual appropriation for any 
explicit subsidy costs.
The Congressional Budget Oﬃce, however, has challenged the FCRA 
method and contends that the Mutual Mortgage Insurance program actu-
ally requires a positive federal subsidy when the actuarial costs are computed 
appropriately (see CBO [2003] and [2006]). There are two main elements of 
contention. The ﬁ  rst element is that the FCRA method excludes adminis-
trative expenses from the subsidy computation. Indeed, were administrative 
costs included, the FCRA method indicates that the FHA received a modest 
subsidy from federal taxpayers in ﬁ  scal year 2007.
The second element is that expected future losses from insurance activity 
are computed as a single average present value under the FCRA method. 
This ignores the dispersion of possible losses, including the likelihood that 
the greatest losses will occur when the economy is in a recession. The CBO 
contends that the covariation of potential realized losses and weak states of 
the overall economy requires that a “risk premium” be added to the compu-
tation. The CBO quantiﬁ  es this risk premium as the diﬀerence between the 
insurance premiums charged by the private mortgage insurance industry and 
the premiums charged by the FHA on comparable mortgages. Using this 
benchmark, the CBO estimates that the FHA program actually received a 
taxpayer subsidy of about $2 billion for ﬁ  scal year 2007 (compared to the 
small surplus computed using the FCRA method).
The FHA disagrees with the principle behind the CBO’s risk premium 
adjustment. In the FHA view, the federal guarantee that backs its insurance 
and the FHA’s privilege to borrow from the US Treasury at risk-  free inter-
est rates are fundamental features of the program, which allow the FHA to 
operate with vastly lower capital ratios than its PMI competitors. The quid 
pro quo is that the FHA program serves a much riskier clientele. In the FHA 
view, an accurate actuarial computation of its expected losses relative to the 
premiums charged is the proper basis for determining the cost, if any, that 
the program imposes on the federal budget.
The proper computation of the program’s subsidy is important if Con-
gress is to make sensible appropriations for the FHA programs in com-
parison with all other discretionary government expenditures and also 
in the evaluation of alternative means for subsidizing housing (for ex-
ample, in comparing HUD voucher programs and FHA mortgage insur-
ance). A proper computation of the subsidy amount would also help 
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may occur when any insurance program suddenly suﬀers losses that exceed 
its revenues.15
5.5      Options for the FHA Single-  Family Insurance Program
The large decline in the volume of FHA and VA mortgage originations 
between 2003 and 2006 raises fundamental questions about the future of 
the agencies. The plummeting share of FHA and VA in total originations 
led to suggestions that the agencies simply be closed. This action would have 
recognized the apparent success of private mortgage insurance in insuring 
risky mortgages. Thus, while the FHA programs may have increased hom-
eownership historically among the eligible population,16 the elimination of 
the FHA might simply induce private lenders to be more aggressive in sup-
plying credit to this segment of the market. The crash of subprime lending 
since 2007 has, of course, provided new life to the FHA and VA programs. 
There remains, however, the long- term question of what the proper role will 
be for the government programs as a restructured mortgage market emerges 
in the aftermath of the subprime crisis.
5.5.1      An Expanded Role for the FHA with Alternative 
Mortgages and Risk-  Based Pricing
One approach would allow the FHA to continue to function in its histori-
cal manner, but to require that it become much more aggressive in using tech-
nology to improve its underwriting policies for higher-  risk borrowers, and 
to incorporate risk-  based pricing in federal mortgage products. This would 
entail an expanded legislative mandate for the agency, increasing loan limits, 
eliminating statutory down-  payment requirements, and encouraging risk-
 based pricing of mortgage products. These directions have been endorsed by 
the various interest groups that would beneﬁ  t from more robust and liquid 
housing markets.17 However, concerns have also been raised that the FHA 
will not have the expertise to manage a more creative underwriting program 
15. As a case in point, Congress recently had to appropriate more than $20 billion to the 
Federal Flood Insurance (FFI) program to cover the unexpected losses created by Hurricane 
Katrina, an amount equal to the total insurance premiums, net of administrative expenses, col-
lected since that program’s inception in 1968; see Government Accounting Oﬃce (2006b). In 
other words, the premiums charged over the program’s forty-  year history actually represented 
more than a 50 percent subsidy. This subsidy had gone unrecognized, because the program 
had broken even on a cash ﬂ  ow basis over its entire history until the 2005 hurricane. But this 
represented only good luck; no previous ﬂ  ood had struck a major metropolitan center—hardly 
the basis for sensible actuarial budgeting.
16. See Quigley (2006) for a further discussion of the dramatic eﬀect of the FHA program 
in expanding homeownership among its clientele households.
17. Some of these measures have been introduced into legislation (e.g., the “Expanding 
American Homeownership Act,” H.R. 1752, and H.R. 5121) and have been debated in the 
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entailing more complicated and riskier loans, and that risk-  based pricing 
will eliminate what some consider the current beneﬁ  cial pattern of cross-
 subsidization of riskier borrowers by safer borrowers (See GAO [2007b] and 
Inside Mortgage Finance [2007a, 2007b]).
5.5.2      Demonstrable FHA Alternative to Predatory and Subprime Loans
An alternative approach, not inconsistent with the preceding proposal, is 
to expand the role of the FHA by focusing on its potential to mitigate preda-
tory lending. As previously noted, the July 2008 Federal Reserve expansion 
of the Truth in Lending regulations is a major step forward. These regula-
tions, if enforced, will no doubt reduce the extent of predatory lending, but 
it is equally clear that they would also reduce the incidence of alternative 
mortgages that are beneﬁ  cial to borrowers and lenders.
Arguably, the operation of a “fully competitive” market could itself pro-
tect less informed market participants. However, the wide range of con-
sumer protection legislation enacted in the United States suggests that 
policymakers are frequently not conﬁ  dent that competitive markets can be 
depended on to perform this role. Even within the ﬁ  nancial markets, the 
US government has historically taken vigorous action to protect consum-
ers. For example, in stock market trading, the SEC regulates brokers and 
mutual funds, requiring them to obtain “best execution” for their custom-
ers, even though, at least in principle, “perfect competition” would achieve 
the same end. Similarly, brokers are held to a “suitability” standard by the 
National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) in mediating retail 
stock transactions. Government intervention in these ways no doubt re-
ﬂ  ects some paternalism, but as Sunstein and Thaler (2003) argue, ﬁ  nancial 
decisions by consumers often reﬂ  ect framing and other behavioral factors, 
with the result that an element of low-  cost paternalism might be judged to 
be highly beneﬁ  cial overall.
Consumer protection has also long been a rationale for housing and 
mortgage market legislation (see US Department of Treasury [2000]). For 
example, the Truth in Lending Act (Regulation Z of the Federal Reserve 
Act) has long speciﬁ  ed very precisely how the terms of installment loans, 
including mortgage loans, must be disclosed to borrowers. For another ex-
ample, the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) regulates the 
behavior of the parties to a home purchase transaction and speciﬁ  es in detail 
the disclosures required by lenders to borrowers. Finally, the Home Owner 
and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA) requires special disclosures concern-
ing prepayment penalties, balloon payments, and negative amortization on 
certain reﬁ  nancings and home equity loans.
These detailed regulations illustrate the fact that Congress has not been 
shy to take a paternalistic stance when it felt poorly informed borrowers were 
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are suﬃciently technical and specialized that it is more eﬃcient to regulate 
predatory lending with speciﬁ  c legislation.
An aggressive and innovative loan demonstration by the FHA can be an 
eﬃcient and eﬀective means to reverse the inroads that predatory lenders 
had achieved as a result of the inherently complex nature of the new mort-
gage contracts. Suppose, for example, legislation enabled the FHA to oﬀer 
risk-  based pricing and adjustable rate mortgages, and at the same time, the 
FHA was directed to develop new alternative mortgage contracts that would 
oﬀer competitive terms to those currently eligible for FHA ﬁ  nancing but 
who had previously been attracted to the private subprime market and at 
least in some instances by predatory lenders.
Disclosures concerning these new alternative FHA mortgages could be of 
potential value in deterring predatory lending to lower-  income home pur-
chasers. Comparable actions by government entities can be found in other 
markets. The student loan market provides some comparison, but the Direct 
Loan Program provided through the US Department of Education does 
not compete head-  to-  head with loans oﬀered by banks and other private 
lenders.18 A more appropriate example at the federal level is the United 
States Postal Service, which provides mailing services that compete with 
private suppliers such as Federal Express and the United Parcel Service. 
And at the state level, the Departments of Insurance in a number of states 
provide comprehensive information on the auto insurance and homeowner 
insurance options available to consumers based on the rate ﬁ  lings of their 
registered insurers.19
To apply this technique to the subprime mortgage market, the FHA would 
have to oﬀer a borrower one or more alternative mortgages for consideration 
well in advance of a scheduled house closing. To allow the FHA to prepare 
these loan oﬀers, information about borrower credit worthiness, assets, home 
appraisal, and so on would have to be transmitted to the FHA in advance of 
a contemplated mortgage transaction by any lender about to make a loan to 
a household eligible for FHA ﬁ  nancing. The concept of requiring lenders to 
make unique disclosures prior to a loan is already a core component of the 
HOEPA. The FHA would be directed to use this information to produce one 
18. The federal student loan programs operate in two forms. The Direct Loan programs use 
government funds, and the loans are originated and serviced by the US Department of Educa-
tion. The Federal Family Education Loan (FFEL) programs use funds provided by a bank or 
other participating lender, but the loans are government guaranteed, and the key loan terms, 
including the interest rate, are identical to the Direct Loan programs. Both of these programs 
compete with fully private market loans that are available from banks and other lenders. Private 
market student loans, in turn, come in diﬀerent versions, including those where the student is 
“certiﬁ  ed” by his or her university versus loans that do not require such certiﬁ  cation.
19. For example, in California, auto insurance premiums are regularly published by the 
state government. See http:/ / interactive.web.insurance.ca.gov/ survey/ survey?typeautoSurvey
&eventautoSearch. For Berkeley, California, for example, the highest rates reported for stan-
dard coverage are more than double the lowest rates.122        Dwight M. Jaffee and John M. Quigley
or more speciﬁ  c loans for consideration by the contracting household. These 
terms would be transmitted to the household in a side-  by-  side comparison 
with those oﬀered by the subprime lender. Mortgage contracts would not 
be enforceable unless the contracting household had explicitly declined the 
terms of an FHA mortgage in favor of a loan supplied in the private mar-
ket. This requirement, together with the suitability rules described earlier, 
patterned after those of the NASD, could provide powerful deterrents to 
predatory lending.
These disclosure requirements would provide the borrower with an 
explicit alternative in the form of an available FHA loan, as well as the full 
set of information suggested by Congress:
This new disclosure should include a table clearly displaying a full pay-
ment schedule over the life of the loan, all fees associated with the loan, 
an explanation of the “alternative features” of the loan (i.e. negative 
amortization) and a full explanation of the risks associating with taking 
advantage of those features, including the timeframe in which borrow-
ers were likely to feel the negative eﬀects of those risks. (Joint Economic 
Committee 2007, p. 18)
Implementation would require FHA-  eligible households to consider 
and reject the terms of competitive FHA mortgages before contracting for 
alternative mortgage ﬁ  nance in the private market. In making this decision, 
borrowers would have the full set of mortgage information, and they would 
have a speciﬁ  c alternative to consider. If, after consideration of the terms 
proﬀered, a household chose alternative mortgage ﬁ  nance, it would not be 
on the basis of incomplete information or the misrepresentation of alterna-
tives. This is probably the best one can hope for in guiding the choices of 
others in a market economy.
5.5.3      Merging the GSE Activities into the FHA/  Government 
National Mortgage Association (GNMA) Nexus
Finally, the breakdown in the mortgage markets following the subprime 
crisis might provide the opportunity to reposition the primary mortgage 
securitization business of the GSEs within a government entity. This 
activity could be operated inside the HUD as a middle-  income mortgage 
guarantee business, parallel to the FHA and GNMA; see Jaﬀee (2009a, 
2009b). Alternatively, this securitization activity could be operated as a new 
government-  owned corporation, which could provide more ﬂ  exibility. The 
exemplary history of the FHA provides a basis for believing that the business 
of guaranteeing and securitizing mortgages—in particular, relatively high-
 quality mortgages—could be eﬃciently carried out by a government entity, 
especially if it were aﬀorded the ﬂ  exibility inherent in a government-  owned 
corporation. The key beneﬁ  t, in the context of the subprime mortgage cri-
sis, is that the new program would provide a strong government safety net Housing Policy, Mortgage Policy, and the FHA    1 2 3
against current and future systemic market failures. We should expect that 
major innovations in mortgage ﬁ  nance would arise and be carried out in the 
private mortgage markets. Thus, it would be critical that any new govern-
ment programs not be subsidized so that they would not crowd out eﬃcient 
private market initiatives.
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Comment  Susan M. Wachter
Authors Jaﬀee and Quigley focus their chapter on an analysis of federal 
programs that provide insurance and housing credit guarantees. After a 
description of a variety of federal government programs, including the 
federally-  chartered government sponsored enterprises (GSEs) Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac, they concentrate speciﬁ  cally on the changes and chal-
lenges to the mortgage insurance and guarantee programs managed by the 
Federal Housing Administration (FHA). They oﬀer speciﬁ  c, policy-  oriented 
recommendations to bolster the FHA’s declining market share.
After the Great Depression, the FHA pioneered the introduction of the 
thirty- year  self- amortizing  ﬁ  xed rate mortgage, the standard mortgage that 
prevailed in the United States for decades. The FHA and Fannie Mae, and 
its predecessor the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation (HOLC)—a federal 
entity—succeeded in reviving a mortgage market then in collapse due to the 
prevalence of “bullet” loans. After World War II, loans insured by the FHA 
lost market share to similarly structured nongovernment or “conventional” 
loans. The FHA’s role evolved to serve lower income households who lacked 
the 10 percent down payment required by the conventional prime market. 
With the explosion (now implosion) of subprime over the past decade, 
FHA’s market share decreased even further until 2008 when, in response 
to the collapse of subprime, FHA market share increased to its current 25 
percent level. The ongoing subprime mortgage market crisis (similar to the 
Great Depression, centered on loans that require reﬁ  nancing at a time when 
ﬁ  nancial markets seize up) makes the role of the FHA newly relevant.1
A large segment of the Jaﬀee and Quigley chapter is devoted to a com-
prehensive and very useful description of all federal housing programs. 
The chapter sets out an historical and contextual analysis of the evolution 
of housing programs over time, pointing to the elimination of supply-  side 
public housing in favor of demand-  side housing vouchers. The chapter 
contrasts this—and other directly funded programs that have lost federal 
support—with the growth of programs indirectly funded through federal 
tax expenditures, including the homeowner deduction and the low income 
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1. For additional discussion on the FHA, see Green and Wachter (2007).